BYZANTINE EYE-WITNESSES OF ANATOLIAN POWER-BREAKERS DURING THE YEARS OF 1421-1423*

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ABSTRACT
Ducas and Chalcocondyles’ chronicles reveal more detailed information than the Ottoman chronicles about the roles of Byzantine Empire and Anatolian emirates during the Ottoman Interregnum (1402-1423). Also a Burgundian diplomat Ghillebert de Lannoy who was present at Byzantine capital-city in 1423 forms a very informative source about the Murad II’s problematic enthronement on which the Ottoman chronicles seem to be extremely laconic. Another group of sources shedding light on this period of Ottoman history is the Anonymous Greek Short Chronicles. These two Byzantine historians of 15th century, Lannoy’s work and short chronicles complete the gaps of Venetian-Genoese official records which give remarkably rich information for the Near-Eastern history. In this paper, we will re-consider the roles of Turkish emirates of Anatolia in Pseudo-Mustapha’s and Mustapha the Younger’s struggles for power (1415-1423) under the light of Byzantine, Ottoman, Italian historical sources.

Keywords: Byzantine History, Ottoman History, Ottoman Civil War, Interregnum, Anonymous Short Chronicles, Pseudo-Mustafa, Mustafa the Younger

ÖZET

Anahtar kelimeler: Bizans Tarihi, Osmanlı Tarihi, Fetret Dönemi, Anonim Greqçe Kısa Kronikler, Düzmece Mustafa, Küçük Mustafa
The period known as Ottoman Interregnum, which in fact had been a significant milestone of the history of Ottoman State, has been treated as one of the details among the bulk of many events being told in the general Ottoman history books; accordingly, the history of this period has not been examined specifically till the recent times. Another related problematic is the uncertainty of the ending date of the period when compared to the more clear beginning date. According to the generally accepted opinion of the historian circles; the Ottoman Interregnum has started after the battle took place on 28 July 1402 between Sultan Bayezid and Tamerlane at Çuluğ near Ankara which resulted with the definite defeat of Ottoman army and following dispersal of the Ottoman centres and has come to an end when Mehmed I (Çelebi in Turkish, Κυρίτζης in Greek, prince in English) has won victory over his brother Musa Çelebi in 1413 in Çamurlu (near modern Samokov of Bulgaria) plane and held the Ottoman throne unrivalled through 1413-1421.¹

According to the historians supporting this date, the Ottoman State has regained and strengthened its unity of territories in this period, which had been lost after the Battle of Ankara, and could have faced the Byzantine Empire again and as stepping on more strong foundations. However, the notes of the Byzantine historians point out that the conditions required for Ottoman unity and strong centralized state could have not been formed in the Mehmed I era and that the State still had been quite fragile by many means, requiring the Byzantine alliance. Indeed, the Byzantine foreign policy through the era of Palaiologos dynasty, aiming to keep the Ottoman powers ever weak, had based on efforts to control the Ottoman Sultan in the centre by playing the threatening card of provoking and assisting of Ottoman princes who are legal successors or who may have the rights to have the throne, by uninterruptedly stimulating the struggles between these brothers. When considered such conditions are still effective in the first years of the reign of Mehmed the Conqueror, it can be thought that Ottoman Interregnum has not ended in 1413 as claimed, but on the date 29 May 1453 with the conquer of Constantinople. Indeed, as also pointed out by Halil İnalcık, if “the struggle between the Ottoman princes that started in 1402 has come to an end with the conquest of Byzantium Constantinople”,² then the ending date of Interregnum characterized with the struggles between the brothers should have been reviewed. The aim of this study is to make use of the witnesses of the Byzantine chronicles which assist this theory and re-analyze the events of the period 1421-23.

When Yıldırım Bayezid has been defeated by Tamerlane in Battle of Ankara on the date 28 July 1402 and captured by the same, the faith of rising Ottoman State and fading Byzantine State happened to be

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² H. İnalcık, «Ottoman Methods of Conquest» Studia Islamica, 2 (1954) 103-106. In 1444, as soon as Mehmed II ascended the throne, he faced the rebellion of Orhan Çelebi, who was thought to be one of the grandsons of Bayezid I. See H. İnalcık, Studies and Documents on Fatih Period I, 3th edition, Turkish Historical Society, Ankara, 1954, 69-70; D. Kastritis, Sons of Bayezid, 4, note 11.
changed with a single strike. After the imprisonment and death of Sultan Bayezid I, 9 June 1403, the Ottoman power is dispersed. The struggle for the throne started among five sons of Bayezid and continued till 1423. On the other hand, the Byzantine capital Constantinople, of which faith is tightly related to the faith of Ottomans and facing difficult conditions since 1394 as being under siege, is saved from being conquered as if the hand of God helped her. Byzantine, thanks to the treaty signed with Süleyman Çelebi, regained the lost lands from Ottomans including the Thessaloniki which was the second biggest city of the empire. The life of the Byzantine State happened to extend about another half century. The struggle for the throne between the Ottoman princes, which meant an Ottoman civil war, continued after Mehmed I’s accession to the throne and even after his death. Mehmed, for long years, had to deal with the rebellion of a challenger who claimed that he had been the lost son of Bayezid in Battle of Ankara. Mustafa had obtained the support of Anatolian Turkish emirs (chieftains), Christian powers in Balkans and Rumelian frontier Turkic warlords as well as of Byzantine Empire. Thus, Mehmed I who faced to loose all he had won suddenly could only deal and manage this problem by giving certain concessions and aforementioned centers to Byzantine emperor.

1421 has been the year to bring out a new period for the Byzantine-Ottoman relations. In 1421, the Emperor Manuel II sent the Dimitrios Laskaris, governor of Thessaloniki, to the palace of Mehmed I in Edirne (Adrianopolis) as a delegate. Sphrantzes writes that an intense diplomacy had been taking place at that time, however, unfortunately, does not inform us about the content of this diplomacy. According to

3 Ducas writes that God defeats the Pharaoh by means of a very special miracle, which is another Pharaoh, and sent him to the bottom of the earth. See Ducas, Ἰστορία Τυρκο-βυζαντινα (1341-1462), ed. V. Grecu, Bucuresti, 1958, 95.4-6; an anonymous tale regarding the Constantinople (by Ottomans) siege states that the destruction of Bayezid was due to the intervention of Theotokos, who is Virgin Mary, mother of God. See P. Gautier, “Un Récit Inédit du Siège de Constantinople par les Turcs (1394-1402)” Revue des Études Byzantines, 23 (1965) 112-114; K.P. Matschke, Die Schlacht bei Ankara und das Schicksal von Byzanz. Studien zur spätbyzantinischen Geschichte zwischen 1402 und 1422, Forschungen zur mittelalterlichen Geschichte 29, Weimar, 1981, 15, note. 38.

4 The only monographic work regarding the Ottoman siege between 1394 and 1402 is the PhD thesis of Dionysios Chatzopoulos. See D. B. Chatzopoulos, Le prémier Siège de Constantinople par les Turcs (1394 à 1402), Université de Montreal, 1995; It was translated into Greek and then published. Regarding the effects of the eight year Ottoman siege on the city, see, D. B. Chatzopoulos, «The FirstSiege of Constantinople by the Ottomans (1394-1402) and its Repercussions on the Civilian Population of the City» Byzantion Studies X, Pt. 1 (1983) 39-51.


6 According to the treaty Süleyman leaves Thessaloniki and its surroundings, which is Kalamaria region and the region from Gallikos river to Vardar valley and sea (παρά Βάρδαρον) to Byzantion. In addition, with the treaty, Byzantion received the castles in the region between Marmara sea (Propontida) and Panionion which lies on Mesembria line of the Black Sea shore. Lastly, again they were the masters of Palatioria, the castles and the salt pans reaching to Thrace, as well as Sporades archipelago (Skiaothos, Scopelos ve Skyros) and other regions in Anatolia, whose names were not mentioned. For the articles related to the regions acquired by Byzantion with the treaty, see Diplomatarium Veneto-Levantinum, II, 290; Acta Albaniae Venetae Sacrorum XIV. et XV. (AAV), ed. Giuseppe Valentini, Milan: P.I.M.E.; Munich, R. Trofenik, 1967, III, 356; For the implementation of the treaty articles, see A. Vakalopoulos, «Les limites » 56-65, Ducas, 127.23, 245.26; «... τῶν Στρύμονος χωρία πάντα ... πλήν Ζστούριου ...» and according to Laon, Chalcocondyles, it is asserted that Byzantion expanded their reign up to Zetoumion (Lamia, Greece in present day). G. Dennis follows this opinion. See G. Dennis, “Byzantion-Turkish Treaty dated 1403 ” 81; E. Zachariadou, «Süleyman Çelebi in Rumili and the Ottoman Chronicles» Der Islam, 60 (1983) 277-279; K. M. Setton, The Papacy and the Levant (1204-1571), II, Philadelphia, 1978, note 43; N. Jorga, Geschichte des osmanischen Reiches nach den Quellen dargestellt (GOR), I, Gotha, 1908, 328; J. Barker, Manuel II Palaeologus (1391-1425). A Study in Late Byzantine Statesmanship, New Brunswick, 1969, 225-226, note. 43; See also K. Matschke, Ankara, 56-64; C. Imber, The Ottoman Empire, Isis Press, Istanbul, 1990, 57-58.


8 Sphrantzes in the only Byzantion historian who mentions that Dimitrios Laskaris was sent to Edirne as an ambassador. See Sphrantzes, Cronaca, ed. Ricardo Maisano, Roma 1960, 10.19-24. Ducas does not mention this embassy and writes that Mehmed 32
Ducas, Mehmed experienced a hunting party accident in Edirne. When he understood he could have not got better again, he called Bayezid Pasha and delivered the administration to him. Mehmed provided his Vizier to give oath for loyalty to the eldest son Murad after his death. Sultan also prepared his will and demanded the tutelage of his two younger sons, eight years old Yusuf and seven years old Mahmud, to Emperor Manuel II. Emperor had promised to not release the Düzmece Mustafa (Pseudo Mustafa) in turn. Annual payment would be sent to the Emperor as a consideration for the two princes to be grown under Byzantine tutelage. Mehmed was aiming to guarantee the Byzantine friendship with this agreement and ease the eldest son Murad's having the throne.9

There was no law giving the throne to the eldest son in principle, however eliminating the future throne candidates without killing them, as under aforementioned agreement, had in fact aimed to clear out the reign of Murad from possible dangers. Mehmed, to prevent a possible struggle between the brothers, had left Rumelia to Murad and Anatolia to his other son of twelve years old Mustafa the Younger (Küçük Mustafa).10 Sultan passed away11 after three days, on the date 21 May 142112. His death is held a secret

would divide the governance of the country into two and Rumelia would be left to one of his son, Anatolia to the other one. In addition, he adds that in order to avoid any possible crown fight and to protect unity of the country, two young prices would be sent to the tutelage of the Byzantine empire. See Ducas, 167; J. Barker does not agree with Ducas’ narration and mentions that Mehmed who united the country would not divide the country because of such a threat. See J. Barker, Manuel II, 351-355, not. 100; F. Dölger, Regesten der Kaiserurkunden des Oströmischen Reiches von 565-1453, 5. Teil, München-Berlin, 1965, no. 3385; J. Hammer, Geschichte des Osmanischen Reich, I, I, C. A. Hartleben, Pest, 1833, 385-386; N. Jorga, GOR, 377, 378.

9 Ducas, 163.10-12, 165.11-15 and 167.6-29; Sphrantzes, 10.24-26, write only that Dimitrios Laskaris was welcomed properly in Edirne, but do not give any information about the devise of sultan Mehmed. According to them Laskaris could not have complete his negotiations with the sultan who said the Byzantine ambassador: «σάθενθναν εξής τινάς ἡμέρας, καὶ μετὰ τὸ ύπαρξαν αὐτῶν συνυπάλλησαν καὶ συνομιλήσασιν (In those days he was ill and once he recovers they will be gathered and will negotiate.»). Neşri, who supports the Byzantine sources says that Mehmed had got very ill, and when he understood that he could not have been recovered, he called his viziers Bayezid, İbrahim ve Hacı İvaz Paşa and organised a secret meeting. Sultan Mehmed ordered them to bring secretly his elder son, prince Murad, in order to be enthroned See Neşri, Kitab-i Cihannümâ, vol. II, ed. F.R. Unat-M. A. Köynem, 2nd edition, Türk Tarih Kurumu Basmevi, Ankara, 1957, 550-551.

10 See H. İnalcık, «Murad II» İslam Ansiklopedisi (1959), 598-599; C.J. Heywood, «Mustafa Çelebi, Küçük» Encyclopedia of Islam, Brill, 2. edition, VII (1993), 712; For a similar treaty which had been concluded with Stefanos Lazareviç see Filozof Konstantin, 56-8; See also H. İnalcık, «Murad II» 598-599.

11 Sphrantzes, 10.26-27, gives detailed information regarding Dimitrios Laskaris’ ambassadorship and its consequences. The way he writes those information shows that he was accustomed to the Ottoman reign and governance; Ducas says that the death of Sultan happened in a hunting trip; the death of Mehmed was mentioned in the Chaloçcolo’s history as well. See Ducas, 163.10-14, See Chaolçolo, II, 1.1.

Manuel II had moved to Peribleptos monastery due to the malaria terrorizing Constantinople. On the other Byzantine capital had being guarded and no one of these messages could reach Constantinople. But Laskaris imprisoning the Ottoman Sultan when he had a chance through the discussions in the spring of 1421. In the meantime, the period in which no messages had been arriving from the Byzantine delegate in Ottoman palace, the Byzantine capital had been experiencing a very stressfull atmosphere. The Emperor Manuel II had moved to Peribleptos monastery due to the malaria terrorizing Constantinople. On the other hand, he was under heavy accusals of the war supporters who were accusing the Emperor for not imprisoning the Ottoman Sultan when he had a chance through the discussions in the spring of 1421.14

According to the notes of Ducas, the reason for keeping the death was eminent: “Their idea was that if the surrounding nations, namely Romans, Serbians, Genovese, Venetians and Karaman Turks in Anatolia, would be aware of the Sultan's death, then it could not be possible for Murad to arrive from Persian borders and take over the throne. Then a big quarrel would come out in relation with succession issues and a rebellion could burst out in the army. Moreover, it was a possibility that Karaman could plunder all Anatolia without a hesitation. Maybe Christians would act same way in Thrace also.”15 A secret message is sent to Murad was the provincial ruler (sancakbeg) in far Amasya16 to enable his clear arrival to Edirne. A messenger informed the viziers, after forty five days from the death of Sultant Mehmed I, that Murad had reached to Bursa and delivered the letters from Murad commanding the funeral ceremony of his father to be performed.17 According to the meaning obtained from the sentences of Ducas, the Grand Vizier Bayezid Pasha was supporting Murad and played a very important role in his enthronement.18 The Byzantine historian (Ducas) Mehmed's reign had included many different parties each supporting a different prince for the throne. Murad had the support of Bayezid Pasha and Çandarlı Ibrahim Pasha. He had proceeded to Bursa as fast as possible once he had taken the message (of his father's death) sent by these two pashas.19 Murad II was enthroned on the date 25 June 1421.20

A new era then was starting for both the Ottoman and Byzantine histories. The Byzantines had to decide which route it would follow. Would they recognize the reign of the son of Mehmed and continue deliberately13 and his body has been medicated as to keep for 40-42 days without burial. The people were given the impression as if Mehmed had been living till the arrival of prince (Şehzade) Murad. The idea of keeping his death a secret was in fact also his own idea. According to the information provided by Sphrantzes, related to the delegacy of Dimitrios Laskaris in the Ottoman palace, no servant in the place, save Mehmed's four men, had known the real situation. The death of Sultan had not been told to Laskaris also, whereas, the latter was waiting in doubt since the Sultan had not been calling him for discussions. Still, Laskaris learnt the truth thanks to his spies in the palace but could not send this new to Byzantine Emperor since all the roads had been guarded and kept closed. He had sent many messengers however all the roads to Byzantine capital had being guarded and no one of these messages could reach Constantinople. But Laskaris managed to communicate his message through another route, via Mesemvria city on the shore of Black sea. 

13 Ducas, 167.30.
14 Sphrantzes, 10.27-12.4
15 See Ducas, 169.9-15.0.27-12.
16 Ducas, 163.27-30; Based on the Ottoman dynasty tradition, Murad, II. has taken over the governance of this province when his father was alive. In 1416, when he was 12, he was appointed grand seignior of the Greek province. Amasya, which is the capital of Northeast Anatolia, was the birthplace of the prince (June 1404). Important cities such as Tokat, Sivas, Çorum and Osmancık were also included. In 1417 the prince, who was still not an adult, commanded a campaign against a revolt started by Börküle Mustafa in Karaburun (Stylario). For this campaign in which all the followers of Bedreddin were slaughtered in West Anatolia. See A. Ksanthinakis, Bασιλεία του Μούρατ B’, 37; The real commander behind these campaigns was the grand vizier Bayezid Pasha...»; See. H. İnalçık, «Mured II» 598.
17 Ducas, 169.16-23.
18 Ducas mentions that the grand vizier Bayezid Pasha was the leading supporter of prince Murad and he was very glad when he received the letter saying that the prince reached Bursa. See Ducas, 169.24-25.
19 Ducas, 169.16-23; For the events during the Murad’s enthronement see A. Ksanthinakis, Bασιλεία του Μούρατ B’, 92-93.
20 Mustafa Çetin Varlık, Germiyanoğulları Tarihi (1300-1429), Ankara, 1974, 91.
peace policy with Ottomans or would they prefer the policy of supporting the throne challengers against the Ottoman central administration as had been introduced by Manuel in the Intercisum period. In that period, Ioannes VIII and some Byzantine aristocrats preferred the second option due to Murad's enthronement and Manuel's seclusion in the monastery due to plague. Ioannes VIII waited the performance of the will of Mehmed to obtain certain concession from Murad. He demanded two young princes, Yusuf and Mahmud to be sent to Constantinople as to be treated under the tutelage of emperor. However his expectations were not responded. This was because Murad refused to give two princes to the Byzantines but sent them to exile in Tokat. One other prince, Ahmet who was younger than Mustafa, had died when Mehmed was alive.

The reason of Murad for sending his brothers was probably that the young princes had supporters. Indeed, the word of Burgundian diplomat Lannoy, who was passing Danube to arrive to Byzantine capital at those times, strengthens this thesis. According to Lannoy, the three rival seigneurs (princes, şehzade) were fighting for the throne. When Lannoy reached Constantinopolis, the Papal Legates were also there for to discuss the Union (union of Eastern and Western churches) problem. However, Lannoy does not reference the names of the princes. The only definite fact is that Papal Legate Antonios da Masa has been in Constantinopolis between September and October 1422.

To the contrary of Ottoman chronicles who were silent about the wars among the princes told by Lannoy and who wrote that Murad was enthroned after Mehmed without any problem, the Ottoman calendars dated 824 Hegira (January-December 1421) and 825 Hegira (December 1421- December 1422) support the information that Murad started to “fight against his brothers” once he sat on the throne. Only the history of Aşıkpaşazade confirms, indirectly, this information saying that Murad has imprisoned his younger brothers to Tokat.

That is to say, Murad has not gained the throne totally free of problems to the contrary of the information given in the history books. He has fought against his brothers and their supporters. He has eliminated his younger brothers, who were not of legal age, to avoid any threats towards his reign. A worth to attention event is that İşfendiya Bey, emir of Kastamonu, has made certain aggressions through this sensitive period in which crisis between the princes had burst out. İşfendiya had repelled the Ottoman ruler of Çankırı, as he had acted in the same manner in past times, for to save himself from the reign of Ottomans.

21 C.J. Heywood, based on Ducas' implicit, defends that Mehmed would divide the governance of the country into two in order to avoid fights among his sons. In his will, Rumelia was left to older son Murad and Anatolia was left to Mustafa the Younger, who was 12 years old. In addition, two younger princes were sent to Constantinople and grow there under the tutelage of the Byzantine empire. See C.J. Heywood, «Küçük Mustafa» 712; A. Ksanthinakis accepts Heywood's theory. See A. Ksanthinakis, Batılima tou Monopat B′, 94.

22 The only Ottoman historian mentioning Tokat exile is Aşıkpaşazade. See Aşıkpaşazade, 445; Şikâri, History of Karamans, ed. M. Mesud Koman, Konya Halkevi Yayınları, Konya, 1946, 62. The historian of Karaman history mentions that the two younger brother were killed in Bursa right after Murad ascend to the throne but Mustafa the Younger was left alive. See H. İnalçık, «Murad II» 598; A. Ksanthinakis, Batılima tou Monopat B′, 93-94.

23 C. Imber, The Ottoman Empire 1300–1481, Isis Press, Istanbul 1990, 91; Oeuvres de Ghilibert de Lannoy, Voyager, Diplomate et Moraliste, ed. H. Potvin, Louvain 1878, 59, 65; E. A. Zachariadou, Ottoman Diplomacy and the Danube Frontier, HUS, Okeanos, Essays Presented to İhor Sevcenko, 7 (1983), 687; J. Barker, Manuel II, 327, 339, 367; Kenneth M. Setton, The Papacy and the Levant (1204-1517), II Philadelphia, 1978, 42-43; Apparently, Lannoy crossed Danube after he was relieved from Murad's brothers Mahmud and Yusuf and later uncle Pseudo Mustafa. While Lannoy was crossing Danube, he was involved with his little brother Mustafa the Younger. A. According to Ksanthinakis, Lannoy's statement regarding three (rival) Ottoman sultans (Mustafa and Cüneyd) is false, because the last one may not claim any right on the throne. The historian, recalling the rebellions did not take place at the same time, thinks that Lannoy had mentioned Murad and two Mustafa brothers in his statement. However, if the statement about the war in the Ottoman dynasty refers immediately after Pseudo Mustafa was eliminated and Mustafa the Younger emerges, the possibility of two Mustafa rebellions are brought together to present as if it was a sole rebellion, should be considered. Bu in this case, Lannoy (as he mentioned in the subsequent chapters) there should not be a security problem in Danube, as Pseudo Mustafa was already eliminated and a war was going on against a second Mustafa. »; See A. Ksanthinakis, Batılima tou Monopat B′, 93; K. Matschke, Ankara, 117.

The son of Murad chased İsfendiyar till Sinop and the peace could be only reached with the mediator acts of other Chieftains. A treaty was made in the winter of 1421. 

When we look at the Byzantines on the other hand, it is seen that young Byzantine Emperor Ioannes VIII has decided to release the Düzmece Mustafa (Pseudo Mustafa) when his expectations for having the tutelage of Ottoman young princes were not met. However, he released Mustafa only after having the promises from him for land donations and particularly promises for giving Gallipoli to Byzantium back. The decision of Ioannes VIII to support the cause of Pseudo-Mustafa meant return to direct hostility and war policy against the new Sultan. Thus, the peaceful era which Sultan Mehmed I and Manuel II had established and maintained sensitively had been terminated.

Murad did not lose time to resolve such a problem targeting directly his throne. The Emperor was not aiming a temporary problem against Ottomans by releasing and assisting Mustafa, but a means for continuous aggression and threat. The purpose was to generate the conditions stipulated by the will of Mehmed I and divide the Ottoman State in two parts. Thus, the harmless Mustafa would rule the European lands of the State and the aggressor Murad would be caged in Anatolia; which in turn to mean the weakening of Ottoman power. The problems of Ottomans with their far and close enemies, respectively Mongols and Karaman Chieftains, had to be made ever existing. The agreement between Mustafa and Manuel II and Ioannes VIII in the summer of 1421 limited his area of activity with Rumelia as having a clause that prohibits his passage to Anatolia.

According to Ducas, Mustafa sent his son to Byzantine Emperor as hostage under the same agreement. Mustafa gave oath to Byzantium to deliver Thessaly, lands till Month Athos (Αγιον Όρος), Black Sea shores till Vlachia and Gallipoli which was being tried to be taken back by Byzantium for about 67 years. Under these conditions, Murad II’s vizier contacted with Emperor Ioannes VIII and sought ways to reach an agreement with Byzantium. Chalcocondyles writes that vizier offered money to Emperor and promised to deliver two princes as hostages and even to give Gallipoli lands partially back. However, any promise could not convince Ioannes VIII. Emperor ordered Dimitrios Laskaris to release Mustafa and Cüneyd who were in prison since 1416. Mustafa and his comrade are transported, with Byzantium vessels, to Gallipoli in September under supervision of Laskaris and together with Byzantium and Turkish soldiers.

Mustafa's gaining support from powerful chieftains of Rumelia was pushing the situation of Murad even more. Mustafa attracted the Evrenosoğulları family in Vardar Yenice to his side and occupied the city of Serres. He coined in this city and declared his reign. His ally Cüneyd joined him in Gallipoli. Murad faced the danger of losing everything likewise his father in past. He could gain the Rumelia chieftains back only with the assistance of another chieftain. This person was Mihaloğlu Mehmed Beg who was the leader of Rumelia raiders and Chief Rumelia governor once. Viziers proposed Murad to discharge Mihaloğlu

28 E. A. Zachariadou, Ottoman Diplomacy and the Danube Frontier, HUS, Okeanos, Essays Presented to Ihor Sevcenko, 7 (1983), 687. Unfortunately, any text of the treaty has not survived.
30 Chalcocondyles, II, 2.
32 Asıkbaşazade, p. 432.
34 Sphrantzes, p. 12.9-25.
Mehmed Beg who had been imprisoned in 1416. According to the opinion of the viziers, only one person could attract back the Rumelias chieftains. The viziers advised Murad to convince Mihaloğlu to act back in service without hesitation. He accepted such advice and ordered Mihaloğlu to be brought from Tokat to Bursa and provided Mihaloğlu to act in service, as planned. Mihaloğlu wrote letters to Evrenosogulları chieftain and to the grandsons of Turahan Beg and asked why they had left the recognized Sultan (Murad) but obeyed the foreigner/not recognized (Düzmece Mustafa) and accordingly accused them. He also guaranteed that they would be forgiven for their crime and called them back to the service of Murad. Accordingly, Rumelia chieftains again joined Murad. Mustafa panicked and escaped to Gallipoli. Mustafa tried to escape to Vlachia from the chasing soldiers of Murad however caught in region of Kızılaç Yenicesi which is to the north of Edirne. He has been put in death on the walls of Edirne castle and in front of the people like an ordinary traitor. The date was 825 Hegira (1422). That is, Murad could


38 Aşıkpaşaçade, p. 434-435; Neşri, II. p. 562-563; Hoca Sadeddin, II. p. 134; Müneccimbaşı, p. 190; [Mustafa] brought many filuri (money) and gave them to Biga kadi. And kadi showed the passage to the prince.; Biga, is a town of Çanakkale and it is located on the southeast of Hellespont.

39 Kızılaç is located north of Edirne, Bulgarian border and it is on the bank of River Tunca. See I.H. Danişmend, Osmanlı Tarihi Kronolojisi I, İstanbul, 1947, index.

40 Aşıkpaşaçade, 436-437; Neşri, II. 564-565; Hoca Sadeddin, II, 135; Ali, 336. Ducas does not know where exactly the event took place and estimating that Pseudo Mustafa plans to escape to Vlachia, he wrote this unclear statement: ‘σωτέλαβον τον Μουσταφαν γέγος ποι της του Ιστρον ογάθης (Mustafa)’yi İstron (nehir) kıyısında yakıb bir yerde yakaladılar’. See Ducas, 229.1-2; Because says that ‘εσώζετο τον ιερόν σώζον καλούµενον (Thus, to get rid of Murad he took refuge in the mountains so-called Ganos because he was approaching)’ and turns us to Proponenta (Marmara) shore, he leads us more confusion. Mentioned In Ottoman sources Kızılaç is located north of Edirne, Bulgarian border and it is on the bank of River Tunca. See Chalocondyles, 7; C. Ötiker, Germiyano Oğlu Yakub Bey’in Osmanlı Sultanı II. Murad Adına Darb ettiirdiği Açıklar, Journal of Turkish Studies, 7 (1983), 316; C. Imber, The Ottoman Empire, 93; For Kızılaç see also I.H. Danişmend, Kronoloji, index. Ottoman sources write that Mustafa’s own men tied and delivered him to the followers before their fleeing. According to the Ruhi Çelebi’s rumor, Mihaloğlu Mehmed Bey arrested Mustafa in Çamurlu (near modern Samokov of Bulgaria). He was executed and his head was sent to Murad. See Ruhi Çelebi, 437. This rumor does not seem logical because they do not match with the information above; H. İnalci, without specifying the source, mentions a rumor telling that Mustafa has been able to escape to Vlachia and he passed to the city Kele in Crimea. See H. İnalci, «Murad II», 600.

41 Anonymous Short Chronicle 53, paragraph 12, p. 381: ‘εξηθήνη ο Μουστάφης (!) ἐξορος ζήλων’ [Mustafa was lost in the year of 6930 (winter of 1422)]; Ducas, 229.4-9; ‘He (Mustafa) was taken before Murad, who have him strangled in a public place like an ordinary crook. Thus, the majority if not everyone finally would understand that he was not Bayezid’s son...’; Enveri writes that Mustafa wanted to seize the throne but he was unsuccessful; In addition, Oruç b. Adil writes that Bayezid has six sons and one of them, whose name was Mustafa, fell down from his horse and disappeared and emerged later in Salonika. He adds that the prince was called Pseudo Mustafa: For legitimacy of Mustafa see. Enveri, Düştûrmame, yaz. Mülkrim Han Yinanç, İstanbul, 1928, 91; For more information see. Aşıkpaşaçade, 436-437; Neşri, II, 556-557, 564-565; Oruç b. Adil briefly discusses this event. See Oruç b. Adil, 54; Hoca Sadeddin, II, 124, 135; Ali, 331; Müneccimbaşı, 191; Sphrantzes, 12, 30-14, 3; Chalocondyles, II, 6, 22-7, 13; İ. H. Uzuncaşılıı really thinks that the rebel is Mustafa. See İ. H. Uzuncaşılıı, Ottoman History, I, TTK, Ankara, 2003, 367 vd; In addition M.C.S. Tekindag, based on many different sources, thinks that Mustafa is the prince of Bayezid. See M.C.S. Tekindag, «Mustafa Çelebi» 687; C. Imber, mentions that the execution of Mustafa was not carried out behind the doors like the other executed members of Ottoman dynasty. The reason behind this public execution is to give impression that Mustafa actually was not a member of the Ottoman dynasty. See C. Imber, The Ottoman Empire, 91-94.

42 While on Ottoman calendar states that this date is 835 Hegira another states 824 Hegira (1421). See Osman Turan, İstanbul’un Fethinden Önce Yazılıms Tarihi Takvimler, Ankara, 1954, 22-23, 83; Anonymous Short Chronicle 53, mentions that the death of
only eliminate Mustafa by winning the Rumelian chieftain begs and now could establish his single reign on all Ottoman lands.

With the death of Pseudo Mustafa, the Byzantine attempt to use a candidate of throne against the Sultan then was resultless but for sure brought penalty. Byzantium had to pay a heavy price. Byzantium had to face a new Ottoman besiege in the beginning of the year 1422 after twenty years of peace era. The old and sick Emperor Manuel II sent two delegates to Murad to prevent such besiege which was a result of wrong decisions of his son Ioannes VIII. He tried desperately to convince the Sultan that Byzantium had not part in the aforementioned developments and insisted that the real responsible party was Bayezid Pasha who did not want to deliver the young princes to the Byzantine tutelage. Once again, he demanded from Murad to deliver the young princes to the tutelage of Byzantium as in accordance with the will of his father.43 Murad harshly flayed the Byzantine delegates and dismissed them. According to Ducas, « Ὅ δὲ Μωρᾶτ τούς ῥηθέντας ἀποκρισαρίους μήτε ἰδεύν μήτε ἄκοιτα θελήσας» [Murad demanded neither to see nor to listen them] and send the Emperor the following message: «Υπάγετε, ἀναγγέλατε τῷ βασιλεῖ, ὅτι ἡδὴ ἐρχομαι ταχύ» [Go and tell your Emperor that I am starting to march at once]. Indeed he gathered his forces at a short time and started marching towards Byzantine capital.44

On 10 June 1422, the Rumelian army, under command of Mihaloğlu Mehmed Beg45 (beylerbeg, chief governor of Rumelia) had reached to the walls of Constantinople with certain plundering in the outer neighborhoods.46 However, the city managed to resist despite all Ottoman pressure and the Basileuousa (the Byzantine Capital) once again was saved when Ottoman army retreated in September 1422. This was by no means related to the miracles thought to guard the city up to that date. The Byzantine diplomacy managed to win once again like it had accomplished many times in history. Constantinople was saved, after dreadful summer months between June and September, once again when Emperor Manuel II, who has been seen as a philosopher and political genius by his contemporaries, introduced his diplomacy of 1402-1413. The Emperor has foreseen the inevitable end and once again provoked Murad II' brother Mustafa the Younger (Küçük Mustafa) and gave birth to an internal commotion in the Ottoman front. Accordingly, Sultan Murad had to leave the besiege. According to the Byzantine chronicles, after resultless attempts to convince Murad II to peace, the Emperor contacted with prince Mustafa the Younger who was brother of Sultan. The person who performed this contact was the prince’s mentor and protector Eliez (İlyas). Manuel wrote letters to İlyas...
and proposed supporting the prince for the throne. When this proposal was reacted positively, Murad faced a new shock as well as the disappointments from an unsuccessful besiege (6th September 1422).  

In the same period Emperor Manuel II was negotiating on the eternal Union (of the two churches in quarrel) problem with the Papal Legates who had arrived to Constantinople on 10 September. Manuel accepted legates on 16th September. While Papal Legates were still in the city on 30th September, Mustafa the Younger (Μουσταφόπουλος as named by Byzantine historians) entered in Constantinople together with his supporters. However the Emperor was struck with a paralysis next day (Thursday, 1 October 1422) after accepting Mustafa the Younger for discussions and died in three days. 

Already aged and ill emperor Manuel had left the power to the hands of his inexperience and warlike son, Ioannes VIII (1425-1448). The certain date and conditions of the alliance agreement between the new emperor and the Mustafa the Younger is not known. However, the Byzantine chronicles inform us that young Mustafa has been married to a princess from Paleologan dynasty.

47 Ducas, 235.19-237.26, is the main source which gives information about Manuel's diplomatic action. Ducas's information is not available in Sphrantzes. See Sphrantzes, 116-117. He was satisfied by telling Murad has withdrawn from Constantinople on 6 September; Barker, states that this information should be cautiously approached because Sphrantzes' chronology regarding this period is unreliable. Sphrantzes' this aspect was emphasized by Anonymous Short Chronicle 13 as well. See Anonymous Short Chronicle 13, paragraph 4, p. 116: «και της 'ςεπτεμβριου της αυτου 'νικτικουν, του χαλια έτους [6931], ήμερα κυριακη, εξελθησαν [ο Μουράτ] άπεδω, όρα της ήμερας άρρητ [Murat] in the world year of 6931 (1422) on 6 September in the 1st indiction at a very early hour of Sunday left here.»; See P. Schreiner, Kleinchroniken, II, 416-417; F. Dölger, based on the Byzantine sources, says that Byzantines paid Ilyas (Eliez) to accompany Mustafa on the way to Paphlagonia and Bursa. Mustafa started a rebellion against Murad in Bursa. See F. Dölger, Regesten, V, no. 3394. For Ilyas Beg, Mustafa the Younger's protector, see Akdes Nimet Kurat, Die türkische Prosopographie bei Laonikos Chalkokondyles, Unpublished PhD thesis, Hamburg, 1933, no. 6, p. 34; Gy. Moravek, Byzantinoturcica, Sprachreste der Türkvolker in den byzantinischen Quellen, II, Berlin, 1958, 123.

48 For the presence of Papal diplomatic mission in Constantinople see J. Barker, Manuel II, 367, note 118. Sphrantzes, 117, gives the date (without referring the days) He states: «και της λαποην του αυτου μηνος [30 Σεπτεμβριου] ήλθεν ο Μουσταφάπουλος και αδελφος αυτου δε του Μουράτη και επέρασε εις την Πολιν και επεκεν εξω εις των ιππικον των ιππικον.»]»; See P. Schreiner, Kleinchroniken, II, 417; F. Dölger, based on the Byzantine sources, says that Byzantines paid Ilyas (Eliez) to accompany Mustafa on the way to Paphlagonia and Bursa. Mustafa started a rebellion against Murad in Bursa. See F. Dölger, Regesten, V, no. 3394. For Ilyas Beg, Mustafa the Younger's protector, see Akdes Nimet Kurat, Die türkische Prosopographie bei Laonikos Chalkokondyles, Unpublished PhD thesis, Hamburg, 1933, no. 6, p. 34; Gy. Moravek, Byzantinoturcica, Sprachreste der Türkvolker in den byzantinischen Quellen, II, Berlin, 1958, 123.

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50 Neither Ducas, nor Chalcodones or Sphrantzes narrate this marriage. Only the later Byzantine historians speak of the marriage. That is Ιστορία πολιτική Κωνσταντινουπόλεως, 4-5, an anonymous source of 16th century, which is not considered very
The Ottoman sources do not provide any information about the role of Byzantium in relation with the uprising of Mustafa the Younger. However, still, they supplement the information of Byzantine chronicles in some means. Accordingly, this rebellion was planned by the Anatolian emirs. Moreover, Ottoman sources accuse Mustafa’s mentor (lala) Şarapart İlyas Beg as with having a very energetic role in this movement. They also add interesting information which claims Germiyanoğlu Yakup Beg (emir of Kütahya), has strengthened the prince in military means and Karaman Beg (emir of Konya), and has assisted the rebellion.

At this point, the expression of Ducas, when combined with the information from Ottoman sources, seems convincing. Accordingly, Manuel contacted with Mustafa when he was in Paphlagonia after his escape from his brother (Murad). Mustafa was brought there by his mentor Şarapart İlyas. This place was under reign of İsfendiyar (emir of Kastamonu). İlyas had the letter of the emperor, which asked from his to bring the young prince to Bursa, here. The Emperor also sent much gold to İlyas for him to gather and organize an army. This was the plan to bring the boy to Bithynia.

The sentences of the sources show us that this rebellion, which threatened Ottoman union as well as central administration, had not been planned only by Byzantium; to the contrary, this was a joint initiative of a very wide allies group. This alliance of Byzantium included predominantly emir of Karaman and also Yakup (emir of Kütahya) and İsfendiyar Beg and even upper ranked Ottoman officers including Şarapart İlyas Beg. One this is for sure that, the Emperor Manuel was in permanent contact with these parties likewise in Düzmece Mustafa rebellion of 1416. The common purpose of Anatolian emirs was to weaken the Ottomans through these internal commotions and to take back the lost lands from Ottomans accordingly.

Reliable. For similar narrations see Εἰκοσί ξρούκων, 2-3, and History of Pseudo-Dorotheus of Monemvasia, 405, whose account are based on the above-mentioned chronicle states that Zampia, daughter of Hilario Doria, emperor Manuel’s illegitimate daughter’s husband, had been given to Mustafa as wife. This theory has been accepted by A. T. Παπαδόπουλος, Versuch einer Genealogie der Palaiologen (1259-1453), Hakkert, Amsterdam, 1962, 70, who identify this princess as Isabella. Papadopolos is based on the not-verified theory of Hopf, Chroniques greco-romanes. Table XII, 2 which identifies in false bastard Zampia/Isabella as stepsister of emperor Manuel. Papadopolos is likewise in Düzmece Mustafa rebellion of 1416. The common purpose of Anatolian emirs was to weaken the Ottomans through these internal commotions and to take back the lost lands from Ottomans accordingly.

51 Broader and clear account for the Byzantine initiative is a short note of an chronicle, which is published by Kougas, Notizbuch eines Beamten der Metropolis in Thessalonike, BZ 23 (1914/19), 154, no. 88: [von τὸν Μουσέωτα ἐξήγαγεν ὁ βασιλεὺς κύριος Μανουήλ ὁ Παλαιολόγος κατ’ αὐτὸν (Μουρατ): Lord emperor Manuel Palaiologos educed him (Mustafa) against him (Murat).].

52 According to the Ottoman sources, Mustafa the Younger namesake of his intractable uncle, was son of Mehmed I, by whom he was assigned as governor to the region of Hamid-ili (Pisidia). Mustafa’s tutor, Şarabart İlyas (Hiliç) Beg had played an important role in movement of the prince. See Aşıkpaşazade, 170; For the same account see Neşri, II, 568-569; Hoca Sadeddin, I, 136; Ruhi Çelebi, 437; Şükruallah, fol. 166b; Uzunçarşılu, Osmanlı Tarihi, I, 390; Anonymous Greek Chronicle, 120; H. İnalcık, Murad II, 600-601, considers that Mustafa Tselembi was 13 years-old then; C. Imber, The Ottoman Empire, 78.

53 The İlyas Beg’s fortune is very interesting. He had supported Mehmed I during his quarrel against his brother, Suleyman. After Mehmed’s first defeat, İlyas deserted to Suleyman’s side and then returned in to the service of Mehmed, when the latter excused him. See Hoca Sadeddin, I, 136.

54 The Ottoman sources writes that Yakub Beg considered young Moutapha like his own son. When Mustafa rose against Murad, the sultan was still dealt with uprising of his uncle, Pseudo-Mustafa. See Aşıkpaşazade, 170; Neşri, II, 566-569; Hoca Sadeddin, II, 135-136; Ruhi Çelebi, 437.

55 Ducas, 237,12-20.

56 Ottoman chronicles as well as a treaty which was concluded between emir of Karaman and the Ottomans in 1444, reveals that the Byzantium had always been keeping close relations with the emirate of Karaman. An Ottoman chronicle contains important information concerning the uprising of Mustafa the Younger. This treaty consists of the most definite assumption for the contacts of the emir of Karaman with the Christian sovereigns. In this one the emir promises that he will not send ambassadors to Christian states in order make them to turn against the Ottomans. The note of Gazavatname about Byzantine emperor had corresponded to the emir of Karaman via Roman Pope is considerable. See Takvimler (Ottoman Calendars), ed. O. Turan, Ankara, 1954; Gazavatname, 83; H. İnalcık, Fatih Devri, 33.
According to the Ottoman sources, in August 1422, Mustafa marched to Bursa with his army gathered from Anatolian emirs (Karaman, Germiyan and Hamit)\(^{57}\) and camped\(^{58}\) in the village of Fidyə Kızığı.\(^{59}\) The rest of the Ducas' words coincide with the Ottoman sources. Accordingly, “just after the start of Mustafa the Younger’s rebellion, a messenger informed Murad that Mustafa has entered in Bursa and recognized as sultan by the people of Bursa. Murad understood the Byzantine plan, retreated from the walls of Constantinople. Mustafa on the other hand headed to Nicaia (İzink) together with İlyas.”\(^{60}\) When Murad was informed of his brother's rebellion he contacted with Şarapart İlyas the mentor of the rebelling prince. He promised him the title “chief governor of Rumelia (Rumeli beylebegi)” if he could delay his brother till his arrival.\(^{61}\) Moreover, Murad asked from İzink's ruler, Ali Beg, to deliver the city to Mustafa. His aim was keeping Mustafa in a known and fixed place. Şarapart İlyas Beg played his part and delayed the young and naive prince with several excuses. Emirs of Kütahya and Karaman doubted the situation and tried to bring the prince to another location; however the prince did not consider their advices but of his mentor. Şarapart placed the prince to the palace of Çandarlı Ibrahim Pasha in İzink. He gathered is divan (council of state) here and therefore managed the young prince to have no doubts. Meanwhile Murad regrouped his army. He entrusted western wing of Rumelia borders to Evrenosolu Ali Beg and northern borders to Firuz Beg. He marched to İzink with the rest of his army. Mehmed Beg met Taceddinoglu during his fast march and exterminated him.\(^{62}\) When Murad reached to the walls of city of İzink,\(^{63}\) most of the Mustafa's army was

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\(^{57}\) In addition, İ.H.Uzunçarşısi says that Young Mustafa rebellion was backed up and provoked by Byzantine Emperor Manuel II so that Murad would retreat his forces from the siege of Constantinople. See İ.H.Uzunçarşısi, Osmanlı Tarihi, I, 149.

\(^{58}\) In August 1422 he stayed here. See H. İnalçık, «Murad II» 600-601; Ş. Tekindağ, «Mustafa Çelebi» 689.

\(^{59}\) Asıkpaşazade mention this place in his chronicle. See Asıkpaşazade, ed. Âlî Bey, 101. In addition Neşri and Sadeddin determine this village Fidyə Kızığı of Bursa. See Neşri, II, 568-569, Hoca Sadeddin, II, 136, identifies this village as Fidyə kızığı which belonged to Bursa.

\(^{60}\) Ducas, 235.31-237.1: «Ὁ ἀδελφὸς σοῦ Μουσταφᾶ εἰσῆλθεν ἐν τῇ Προύσῃ καὶ ὑπεδέχατο ὁ τῆς πόλεως καὶ ὑπερθηκαν αὐτὸν ὡς ἡγεμόνα ἀπάρα ἐκ τῆς Προύσῃς οὖν τὸ συμπέπτεν Ἐλεῖς ὁπάγα εἰς τὴν Νίκαιαν (Your brother Mustafa has already entered Bursa and the inhabitants of the city welcomed him and saluted him as sovereign. He left immediately Prousou together with Sarapart Eliez and moved to Nicaia; According to the Ottoman chronicles, the inhabitants of Bursa had not been subjected to Mustafa. After they had been gathered and decided to send Âhî Yakub Beg as negotiator to Mustafa in order to ask him to discuss his leaving to another region. disappointed and hopeless Mustafa directed to Nicaia (İzink). In this period governor of the castle was Firuzoglu Ali Beg, who had already prepared it with strong fortifications. Asıkpaşazade, 170, writes that «[the inhabitants] sent Âhî Yakub and Âhî Kadem»; See also Neşri, II, 568-569; Hoca Sadeddin, II, 136-137; Ruhi Çelebi, 437; Behiştı, 99, writes «[the inhabitants] had sent Âhî Yakub and Âhî Kadem with lots of presents»; Neşri, II, 568-569; Hoca Sadeddin, II, 136-137, determines the ambassadors as «Âhî Yakub καὶ Âhî Hıskadem»; Ruhi Çelebi, 437.

\(^{61}\) Asıkpaşazade, Neşri and Hoca Sadeddin write that «[Murad] promised him [Şarabdar İlyas Beg] to give the seat of governorship (beylerbeylik) of Anatolia». See Asıkpaşazade, 171; Neşri, II, 568-569, and Hoca Sadeddin, II, 137; But Âî and Ruhi Çelebi do not give any information about Murad’s contact with Şarabdar İlyas Beg and his promises to him. See Âî, V, 202; Ruhi Çelebi, 437.

\(^{62}\) The full name of this person is Taceddinoglu Mehmed beg. See Asıkpaşazade, 172; Neşri, II, 570-571; But Sadeddin, II, 138, writes that Taceddinoglu had been arrested in İzink and executed with prince Mustafa; Ruhi Çelebi, 437, says that Taceddinoglu founded in a hencoop, where he had been hidden to escape Murad's men.

\(^{63}\) The Ottoman chroniclers while narrating the above-mentioned crash say that Mihaloglu Mehmed beg and Taceddinoglu had injured each other. The first one fell down his horse because his wound was bad, the second one killed him easily by his sword. See Asıkpaşazade, 172; Neşri, II, 570-571; Hoca Sadeddin, II, 138; Ruhi Çelebi, 437.

\(^{64}\) Âî, V, 202, states that the sultan arrived İzink (Nicea), without saying anything about his route. If Müneccimbaş, 194’s account, according which Murad had been in front of the walls on Byzantine capital-city, is true, then he was supposed to arrive his target in 9 days. This confirms either he was delay was on the road or reached from Edirne to İzink in 9 days. Besides Ducas, 237,5 and 13-10, says that ‘when Murad was informed about the uprising he went to Edirne, where he began to preparations for a military operation, arrived to Gallipoli in 3 days, from where passed the Dardanelles and rushed to İzink together with his army in 24 hours’; According to Asıkpaşazade, 171, after Murad moved from Adrianople he reached to İzink in 9 days, while Behiştı, 99, without saying anything about the duration of movements of Murad, writes that he had come to İzink via Gallipoli; Comparing the information of these sources one can conclude that Murad arrived İzink in 9 days; See Ruhi Çelebi, 437; S. Kougeas, «Notizbuch», p. 154, note 88: «αἱ μνημειώματα καὶ ίσως πρώτης τοῦ Ἐλείς (= 1423) ἔτους ἔπεσαν οἱ Μουσταφᾶς δύσων λάτρειας εἰς τὴν Ανατολίαν καὶ ἀπέκλειεν δόλω ἐν ἐπιβολής τῶν ἄδελφων αὐτοῦ τῶν Μουσταφᾶς εἰς τὴν Νίκαιαν.» On 24 January, 1st
indication of World year +, ὥρα (= 1423) sultan’s son Murad ... passed from the West to the East and by means of deception and treachery besieged his brother Mustafa in Nikaia.

65 Aşıkpaşažade, 172, writes that prince Mustafa was being in a bath when Murad arrived. The other sources follow Aşıkpaşažade's account. See Neşri, II, 570-571; Hoca Sadeddin, II, 137, writes that İlyas beg pushed him into deuach (şarap ılemleri) together with all his men in order to keep him in town until Murad reach there; See also Müneccibaşı, 194; The exact chronology is given by a short historical note. See also S. Kougeas, Notizbüch einem Beamten der Metropolis in Thessalonike, Byzantinische Zeitschrift 23 (1914/19), p. 154, no. 88: [... εν μν ἵνανα εἰπώτες του ὥρας.] On 24 January, 1st indication of World year 699? (= 1423) sultan’s son Murat passed from the West to the East and by means of deception and treachery besieged his brother Mustafa in Nikaia (whom emperor Manuel Pašalioğlus released.)

66 İmrahım, Mirahur, is corruption of the term Ems-i Ahûr, which was title of servant of the stable in the Ottoman court. This post had been created in the time of Murad I (1361-1389). For a detailed information about «İstabl-ı Amire» see İ.H.Uzunçarşı, Osmanlı DEVLETLİNE SıVAR TEŞKİKATI, Ankara, 1945, 488. See also Z. Pakahn, Osmanlı Tarihi Deysileri ve Terimleri Sızlüğü, İstanbul, 1971, II, 54.

67 Aşıkpaşažade, 172; Neşri, II, 572-573; see also Behişi; 100; Müneccibaşi, 194; Lütfi Paşa, 80-81; Ruhi Çelebi, 437, writes that Mustafa was buried in İnlik; Ali, V, 202, follows his account; Chalcocondyles, 12-13; Anonymous Short Chronicle 91, paragraph. 10, p. 624: «καὶ ὅ τοῦ Μουσταφᾶς [Mustafa died in the world year of 6931 (1423)]]»; S. Kougeas, «Notizbuch», p. 154, no. 88: «ὁ Μουσταφᾶς προδοθῆ παρά τοῦ πολαρχοῦ του καὶ τοῦ Ἱπποτῆ ἀλλὰ καὶ ἄλλων τινῶν, καὶ ἔπεινηκεν αὐτῶν ὁ Μουρατῆς τῇ κ’ τοῦ δῶν ἀληθῆς Ἰνομαιρίον μνήμης (Mustafa was betrayed by his mentor Turk İpiyar Aliaz (Şarpata İlyas) and others and Murat strangled him on 20 January above mentioned ): + This text gives the date (24 January 6931 1. indication) (1423) for the passing of Murad to Anatolia. And then, however, gives 20 January of the same year as the date of Mustafa’s execution. For the related discussions on these documents see N. Jorga, «Sur les deux pretendants Mustapha du XVe siècle, », Revue historique du sud-est europeen, 10 (1933), 13, shows that we have to read February 20 as the second date. See also Barker, Manuel II, 369, note 121. Meanwhile, this account could not be justified totally by the wording of the text, thereby, its worth for the chronology remains open. Sphrantzes, 117, gives the reason of Murad’s passing generally. Ducas, 237, maintains that Mustafa was 6 years-old when he hurried in Bursa without mentioning anything about İlyas’ betrayal. See also Chalcocondyles, II, 12-13, and Anonymous Greek chronicle 111, 60; Constantine the Philosopher, 58-59, who locates wrongly the episode of young Mustafa’s uprising before the Ottoman besiegement of Constantinople. This chronological mistake was overpassed by St. Stanojevic, ‘Die Biographie’, 469; see also J. Barker, Manuel II, 369, note 121; Pears, 15; St. Stanojevic, ‘Die Biographie’, 469; See also J. Hammer, Geschichte, I, 415-417; N. Jorga, Geschichte, 381-382. H. Inalcık, supports that Mustafa was executed in the winter of 1422. See H. İnalçık, «Murad II», 600.

68 Sphrantzes, 117; Ducas, 237; Laon. Chalcocondyles, II, 12-13; Anonim Grikçe Kronik 111, 60; Constantine the Philosopher, Lebensbeschreibung des Despoten Stefan Lazarević von Konstantin dem Philosophen, ed. Maximilian Braun, The Hague, 1956, 58-59; The date of Mustapha’s death is 20 February 1423. This text gives the date as 24 January 6931, 1st indication (1423), for the passing of Murad from the Straits. Later, however, gives 20 January of the same year as the date of execution of young prince. N. Jorga, states that we have to read 20 February for the second date. See N. Jorga, Sur les deux pretendants Mustapha du XVe siècle, 13; See also J. Barker, Manuel II, 369, note 121; Pears, 15; St. Stanojevic, ‘Die Biographie’, 469; See also J. Hammer, Geschichte, I, 415-417; N. Jorga, Geschichte, 381-382. H. Inalcık, supports that Mustafa was executed in the winter of 1422. See H. İnalçık, «Murad II», 600.

69 Ducas, 237, 20; See also Behişi; 100; Müneccibaşı, 194; Lütfi Paşa, 80-81; Ruhi Çelebi, 437, writes that Mustafa was buried in İnlik. Ali follows Ruhi’s rumor. See Ali, V, 202.

70 See Sadeddin, II, 138. Neşri, does not mention where he was buried. See Neşri, II, 572-573. Müneccibaşı, includes another rumor which says that Mustafa was blinded and he was dead because he couldn’t bear this pain. See Müneccibaşı, 194.

71 The date is given by an anonymous note from Thessaloniki: P. Schreiner, Chronologische Einzelnotizen, 618; Ducas, 237; Sphrantzes, 14; Laon. Chalcocondyles, II, 12-13; Anonymous Short Chronicle 91, paragraph 10, p. 624; See also J. Barker, Manuel II, 369.
1423 and fell to the Ottoman hands in 1430, while Despotate of Morea (Mistra) became the target for the Ottoman raids.\footnote{J. Barker, \textit{Manuel II}, 369, note 122.}

That this period has been exhaustively analyzed in military dimensions raises basic questions. Such kind of analysis is not adequate to give reasonable answers especially for 'why new emperor Ioannes VIII Palaeologos changed the foreign policy of established by his father, although he had known that it would cost the loss of peace and would bring again war to Constantinople with the Turks?' Therefore, in order to understand the history of the period it is necessary to examine and to underline the importance of economic and social conditions in the Byzantine 15th century.


In the narrative sources of the 15th century some hints can be detected on the convening of assemblies of the inhabitants of Constantinople, which are of particular interest for the operation of the Byzantine political system during this period.\footnote{Ducas, XIV, 1, XXXIV, 2; Chalkokondyles, II, 57, 141.} As it is known, the presence of ‘demos’ has a remarkable prehistory in Byzantium. The demos always remained as one of the essential political figure in Greek-speaking world, even when its presence was needed only for ceremonial sealing of the ascension of a new emperor. In the 15th century, however, the intervention of the demos seems that it was not only ceremonial. Historians of the conquest of Constantinople mentions indirectly the assemblies of inhabitants of the city, during which important decisions were taken, and even decisions concerning the movements of capitulation with the Turks.\footnote{T. Kiosopoulou, \textit{Βασιλεύς ή οικονόμος}, 159-163.}

The assembly of the inhabitants of Constantinople or its convocation are an issue associated with the manner by which the later Palaiologoi were forced to rule. Besides some of these assemblies are also known that they are called by the emperor. Already in 1347 emperor Ioannes Kantakouzenos had convened an assembly, ecclesia (ἐκκλησία), whose representatives were coming from different social groups, the aristocrats, the µέσοι (middle class), the demos and the ecclesiastical authorities.\footnote{T. Kiosopoulou, \textit{Βασιλεύς ή οικονόμος}, 161.} This was observed by many historians as an indication of the tendency to widen the social base of the imperial power, due to the pressure exerted by the µέσοι, new men, who would have been mixed and united in the older aristocratic class in the 15th century.\footnote{T. Kiosopoulou, \textit{Βασιλεύς ή οικονόμος}, 57.}

In the mid-14th century, Alexios Makrembolites a rather moderate scholar who lived in the imperial court wrote Dialogue between rich and poor. The text written in a climate of civil war between Ioannes VI Kantakouzenos and Ioannes V Palaeologus reflects a new reality on the Byzantine society: the ‘µέσοι’ those who had money and different economic logic in comparison with the old aristocratic class (well-known to Makrembolites), had begun to be written into the collective consciousness as socially powerful parallel and apparently threatening to the aristocrats, who monopolized the social power during the previous centuries,
combining political and economic power. The Dialogue reveals a social conflict between aristocrats and the µέσοι. In the perception of Makrembolites the rich men were the people who enjoyed their wealth without toil. Their behavior as described in the text was the behavior of people of money: the component of force was gold for the acquisition of which these newly riched people would sell even their soul. In this context their attachment to money differed from the former rich men who had their wealth to relieve the poor. The author as main source of newly acquired wealth first considers επιστήµη, i.e. craft industry, and trade of goods and then temperance and dynasty. The ‘µέσοι’ as mentioned in the sources of this period were involved mostly in trade mainly in Constantinople. This class of new men includes ship owners who were chartering for the transport of goods and general practitioners who were earning their money by the sea.\textsuperscript{81} It is interesting that in the 15\textsuperscript{th} century the governing layer of Byzantine society was consisted of not only aristocrats but also people who have commercial or business activities. Some merchants were wealthy and were active in the area from the Byzantine lands to Italy. Like Goudelis and Notaras families belonged to the layer which is consisted of the rulers of Constantinople and even aristocrat entrepreneurs who were working eagerly about their commercial interests, they also served the emperors as agents in the West for economic affairs of the Byzantine state.\textsuperscript{82}

N. Oikonomides had made the critical observation that at the end of the 14\textsuperscript{th} century disappeared in the literary sources the term ‘µέσοι’.\textsuperscript{83} The members of the old aristocracy, because of the scarcity of land as a result of Ottoman expansion, have also been engaged in commercial activities and ceased to be a social group clearly distinguishable from the ‘µέσοι’. Thus the members of the dominant social class lords of the 15\textsuperscript{th} century, whether who are coming from the aristocracy or entrepreneurs they certainly had a different economic behavior compared with the aristocrats of the previous centuries. They were interested only in their participation in the exercise of political power by seeking the alliance and the recognition of the emperor. The existence of them in the assemblies, both called by the emperor or the Council of the (Constantino)Polis was signal an evolution of the political system in 15\textsuperscript{th} century Byzantium. It is considered possible that in the assemblies not only the senators participated but also the richest residents of Constantinople who had their own authority. The persons who described as political rulers by Byzantine historians were also wealthy entrepreneurs who were even with their activities involved in everyday economic life of their fellow citizens, without having any office but only the title of οικείος (close person to the emperor).\textsuperscript{84}

But if we suppose that a city council existed and functioned in Constantinople, consisting of the so-called political leaders, it is reasonable to associate that with some of the mentioned assemblies. Information also of Ducas and Chalkokondyles for collective decisions of demos indicate that apart from the assemblies that called by the emperor, and other assemblies of citizens, perhaps on the initiative of the political rulers were gathered.\textsuperscript{85}

The large number of laudatory texts (encomia) and the epitaphs dedicated to Byzantine emperors are connected with this apparently mainly tactics, which, consequently, was not addressed only to the senators, but also the lords of Constantinopolitan demos which are defined in these texts. In the content of the encomia, it can be seen also the tactics followed by these emperors, to ensure as far as possible smooth implementation of their policy. According to encomion, written by Manuel Chrysoloras for Manuel II Palaeologus, the emperor declared his decisions to his subjects. It demonstrates that the last Palaiologoi

\textsuperscript{81}I. Ševčenko, «Alexios Makrembolites and his "dialogue between the rich and the poor"» Zbornik radova Vizantoloskog instituta 6 (1960), 187-228; T. Kiosopoulou, Βασιλείς ή οικονόμοι, 42-46.

\textsuperscript{82}T. Kiosopoulou, Βασιλείς ή οικονόμοι, 54-56.

\textsuperscript{83}N. Oikonomides, Hommes d'affaires, 119-123; T. Kiosopoulou, Βασιλείς ή οικονόμοι, 57.

\textsuperscript{84}T. Kiosopoulou, Βασιλείς ή οικονόμοι, 159-163.

\textsuperscript{85}T. Kiosopoulou, Βασιλείς ή οικονόμοι, 162-163.
strengthened the assemblies of the powerful inhabitants of Constantinople by their own way, because they needed them, that is, they wanted to derive their legitimacy of these assemblies.\textsuperscript{86}

According to the historians the conquest of Constantinople the demos had also intervened in the family conflicts of Paleologoi, stating its preference for one or another emperor. Chalkokondyles attributes the choice of Manuel as emperor at collective decision of the Byzantines,\textsuperscript{87} while Ducas comments the Manuel’s fears in view of the conflict with his nephew Ioannes VII, whether the demos would be divided and the conflict would extend.\textsuperscript{88} On the same occasion also Ducas informs us that when Manuel II delivered the city his opponent and nephew Ioannes VII (1399) before leaving for the West, he had spoken in front of all people of highest rank and the demos. The emperors could not ignore the demos but he had to seek its acceptance. The new political conditions and the social reality in which dominated the aristocracy and businessmen of Constantinople influenced the exercise of imperial power. Both Manuel and Ioannes were controlled also by their supporters for the effectiveness of their foreign policy.\textsuperscript{89}

The rhetorical texts were not addressed only to the opponents and supporters of Paleologan emperors. As regards especially Ioannes, the encomion (praise text), written for him can be read as a response of members of the military party, who were his supporters addressing the followers of moderate foreign policy of Manuel II. Many members of richmen; entrepreneurs or traders had organic ties with the Western world because of their business. They were unionists, pro-Western men of warlike policy against the Turks,\textsuperscript{90} especially uncompromising young sultan Murad II. Therefore, the young emperor Ioannes VIII had no other choice but to obey to the demands of these men breaking the treaty of peace which established by Manuel II and Mehméd I in 1423.

Byzantine rhetorical texts help us to detect more clearly this development on which we have vague and few information. These texts highlight the pattern of emperor and their contents introduce the qualifications of the emperor: defensor of the church, wise, brave, righteous, humble but also majestic, a man who cares for the good of common, also effective in the military domain and brave. The determination of qualifications of a good emperor, educated and good soldier, goes back to early period and reflected almost in all imperial texts (βασιλικοί λόγοι).\textsuperscript{91} But as the cruel reality of those difficult times showed at the end, the Byzantine Empire required, as Manuel envisaged, a good steward rather than a good emperor.\textsuperscript{92}

\textsuperscript{86} T. Kiosopoulou, Βασιλεύς ή οικονόμος, 160-164.
\textsuperscript{87} Chalkokondyles, II, 57.
\textsuperscript{88} Ducas, XIV, 3, XVIII, 1; T. Kiosopoulou, Βασιλεύς ή οικονόμος, 160.
\textsuperscript{89} T. Kiosopoulou, Βασιλεύς ή οικονόμος, 161, 178.
\textsuperscript{90} T. Kiosopoulou, Βασιλεύς ή οικονόμος, 45-52, 69-70, 178.
\textsuperscript{91} T. Kiosopoulou, Βασιλεύς ή οικονόμος, 189-200.
\textsuperscript{92} Sphrantzes, Chronikon, ed. Richardus Maisano, Roma, 1990, XXIII, 7.18-22, p. 82, describes a scene between already very sick Manuel and Ioannes Palaeologus, when the elder emperor trying, without success, to persuade his successor to follow his moderate policy, the old emperor turned to the writer of chronicle attended there and told him: ὁ υἱός μου ἔνι μὲν ἄρμοδος βασιλεύς, οὐ τοῦ παρόντος καιροῦ βλέπει γὰρ καὶ φρονεῖ μεγάλα καὶ καταματα, οία οἱ καιροί ἔχθεν ἐπὶ τῆς εὐημερίας τῶν προγόνων ἡμῶν. Πλὴν τῇ σήμερον ὡς παρακολουθοῦσιν ἡμᾶς τὰ πράγματα, οὐ βασιλέα θέλει ἡμῶν ἢ ἀρχη, ἀλλ’ οἰκονόμον [my son is true emperor, though not of our present times. For he expects, and has in mind such great things appropriate for the prosperous times of our ancestors. But today, as if things are pursuing us, our empire does not demand an emperor but a steward.]; T. Kiosopoulou, Βασιλεύς ή οικονόμος, 186-187.
CONCLUSION

The Ottoman civil wars which started in 1402 ended only in 1423 overshadowing sultan Mehmed I’s efforts to reunite the divided state and its supporters after the catastrophe in Ankara. A sudden accident eventually led the sultan to death forced him to find a workable solution to prevent the slaughter of younger sons by the new sultan, but also get rid of destructive results of possible conflicts in his family. Before his death he chose to give his two younger sons under the tutelage of Manuel II and to share his sovereignty between Murat and Mustafa. He should have calculated that the success of this plan for a smooth succession of his firstborn son Murad depended on securing the Byzantine neutrality. He should have realized that this project could only succeed with a contract which will bind the Byzantine emperor to take custody of two smaller princes, while Murat ruled in Anatolia and Mustafa in Rumeli in peace.

One may wonder if the Sultan thought that Byzantium could create crises in any time against the Ottoman state instigating the above princes. I guess that sultan understood all the possible impacts of the project. That is he was fully aware that Byzantine emperor in case of Ottoman threat could implement the policy which followed by the period of Ottoman civil wars. Precisely for this reason he should have wanted to ensure the political balance that had been created by Manuel II and himself. But, I think, the real reason that prompted the sultan to think this project was the vulnerability of the Ottoman state. Because, although the historical research reiterates for years the view that with the rise of Mehmet I the state reestablished and there was no longer any obstacle to the Ottoman expansions in the Balkans which halted because of defeat in Ankara, the situation of the state was not so stable. As Mehmed I knew, the emirates of Anatolia still exist and exert considerable influence in the internal affairs of the Ottomans. As examined above, the emirs had played an important role in the quarrels of the princes of Bayezid.

The unstable and fragile situation of the state, I believe, forced Mehmed to conclude a contract with Byzantium with the terms of which he would keep his successors always in the game and the state in safe, if the delicate balance between the Byzantines and Ottomans would not be disturbed. Thus, Mehmet should have wished to safeguard of the permanence of the Ottoman state. The sultan should have estimated that this plan would save the state from possible internal conflicts, which will have fueled by the Byzantines and their Turkish allies in Anatolia. We must not forget that the state had been shocked for a decade because of the civil war and came close to collapse. In my opinion, the case of guardianship of the Byzantine Emperor also revealed a truth. Mehmet could not have empower so much the power of the central administration of the Ottomans as supported by modern historians. And precisely for this reason the sultan wished the Byzantine tutelage for his young sons because this tutelage would remove every possible influence of Turkish emirs who may support them to claim rights on the throne.

Additionally, Mehmet sought to attract his Byzantine 'father' (as he defined Manuel II years ago) on his side rather than to push him to the opponent faction. But because of warlike policy of their successors this plan did not materialize. The young Sultan Murad II chose to secure his throne in a risky way. When the Byzantine mission demanded the delivery of two small princes he chose to imprison his brothers and then to eliminate them.

In the same time in Constantinople the new political elit preferred to change the foreign policy and asking war against the Turks. The cabinet which was consisted of rich traders of Constantinople forced convinced Iohannes to break the peace. The young emperor who derived his power of these men forced to release two Mustafas. Murad forced to face revolts of two Mustafa and he would almost loose everything. He regained the control thanks to Mihaloğlu who convinced the begs of Rumeli to stop supporting Pseudo-Mustafa.
Consequently, two young and ambition rulers understood in a hard way that it was too early for a decisive fight from which only one of them would survive at the end. Both of them must have learnt that they should eliminate first the power-breakers located in their administrational mechanism in order to gather all the power in their own hands. This achievement would belong to Murad II's successor, Mehmed II, who stopped the Ottoman civil wars not only by conquering Constantinople, but also increasing the control of the central administration and after he established his authority on the upper ranked Ottoman officers, who were internal power breakers, since in the past they could easily betray their sultans.93

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